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WHAT KIND OF ATHING IS A NUMBER?
ATalk With Reuben Hersh
Interviewer: John Brockman
New York City
Reben Hersh
University ofNew Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131
rhersh@math.unm.edu

"What is mathematics?It's neither physical normental, it's social. It'spart of culture, it's part of
history. It's like law, like religion, like money, like all those other things which are very real, but
onlyas part of collective human consciousness....That's what math is. "
For mathematician Reuben Hersh, mathematics has
existence or reality on ly as part of human cu ltu re.
Despite its seeming timelessness and infallibility, it is
a socia l-cultural-historic phenomenon. He takes the
long view . He thinks a lot about the ancient problems.
What are numbers? What are triangles, squares and
circles? What are infinite sets? What is the fourth dimension? What is the meaning and nature of ma thematics?
In so doing he explains and criticizes current and past
theories of the nature of mathematics. His main purpose is to confront philosophical problems: In w hat
sense do mathematical objects exist? How can we have
knowledge of them? Why do mathematician s think
mathematical entities exist forever, independent of
human action and knowledge?
Reu ben Hersh is professor emeritus at the University
of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He is the recipient (with
Martin Davis) of the Chauvenet Prize and (with Edgar
Lorch) th e Ford Prize. H ersh is the author (with Philip
J. Davis) of The Mathematical Experience, winner of the
National Book Award in 1983. His new book, What is
Mathematics, Really? is forthcoming (Oxford ).
JOHN BRO CKM AN: Reuben, got an interesting question?
REU BEN H ERSH: What is a number? Like, what is
two? Or even three? This is sort of a kindergarten question, and of course a kin dergarten kid would answer
like this: (rai sing three fingers). Or two (raising two
fingers) . That's a good answer and a bad answer. It's
good enough for most purposes, actually. But if you
ge t way beyond kindergarten, far enough to risk ask-
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ing really deep questions, it becomes: w hat kind of a
thing is a number?
Now, when you ask "What kind of a thing is a n umber?" you can think of two basic answers-either it's
out there some place, like a rock or a ghost; or it's inside, a thought in somebody's mind. Philosophers have
defended one or the other of those two answers. It's
really pathetic, because anybody w ho pays any at tention can see right away that they're both completely
wrong.
A nu mber isn't a thing out there; there isn 't any p lace
that it is, or any thing that it is. Neither is it just a
thought, because after all, two and two is four, whether
you know it or not.
Then you realize that the question is not so easy, so
trivial as it sounds at first. One of the great p hilosophers of mathematics, Gottlob Frege, made quite an
issue of the fact that mathematicians didn't know the
meaning of One. What is One? Nobody could answer
coherently. Of course Frege answered, but h is answer
was no better, or even worse, than the previous ones.
And so it h as continued to this very day, strange and
incredible as it is. We know all about so much mathematics, but we don't know w hat it really is.
Of course w he n I sa y, "Wh at is a number?" it applies
just as we ll to a triangle, or a circle, or a d ifferentiable
function, or a self-adjoint operator. You know a lot
about it, but what is it? What kin d of a th ing is it? Anyhow, that's my question. A long answer to your short
question.
JB: And what's th e answer to your question?

HERSH: Oh , you wa nt the answer so quick? You have
to work for the answer! I'll approach the answer by
gradual de gree s.

between political belief and belief about the nature of
mathematics.
JB: Do you have a name for this solution?

When you say that a mathematical thing, object, entity, is either completely external, independent of hu man thought or action, or else internal, a thought in
your mind- you're not just saying something about
numbers, but about existenc e-that there are only two
kinds of existence. Everything is either internal or external. And given that choice, that polarity or dichotomy, numbers don't fit-that's why it's a puzzle.
The question is made difficult by a false presupposition , that there are only two kinds of things around.
But if you pretend you 're not being philosophical, just
being real, and ask what there is around, well for instance there's the traffic ticket you have to pay, there's
the news on the TV, there's a wed d ing you have to go
to, there's a bill you have to pay-none of these things
are just thoughts in your mind, and none of them is
external to human thought or activity. They are a different kind of reality, that's the trouble. This kind of
reality has been excluded from metaphysics and ontology, even though it's well-known-the sciences of
anthropology and sociology deal with it. But when you
become philosophical, somehow this third answer is
overlooked or rejected .
Now that I've set it up for you, you know what the
answer is. Mathematics is neither physical nor men tal, it's social. It's part of cultu re, it's part of history, it's
like law, like religion, like money, like all those very
real things which are real onl y as part of collective
human consciousness. Being part of society and culture , it's both internal and external. Internal to society
and culture as a whole, external to the individual, who
has to learn it from books and in school. That's what
math is.
But for some Platonic mathematicians, that proposition is so outrage ous that it takes a lot of effort even to
begin to consider it.
JB: Reuben, sounds like you're about to pu sh some
political agenda here, and it's not the Republican platform.
HERSH: You 're saying my philosophy may be biased
by my politics. Well, it's true! This is one of the many
novel things in my book-looking into the corr elation
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HERSH: I call it humanistic philosophy of mathematics. It's not really a school; no one else has jumped on
the bandwagon with that name, but there are other
people who think in a similar way, who gave it different names. I'm not completely a lone wolf here, I'm
one of the mavericks, as we call them. The wolves baying outside the corral of philosophy.
Anyhow, back to your other question. The second half
of my book is about the history of the philosophy of
mathematics. I found that this was best explained by
separating philosophers of mathematics into two
groups. One group I call mainstream and the other I
call humanists and mavericks. The humanists and mavericks see mathematics as a human activity, and the
mainstream see it as inhuman or superhuman. By the
way, there have been humanists way back; Ari stotle
was one. I wondered whether there wa s any connection with politics. So I tried to classify each of these
guys as either right-wing or left-wing, in relation to
their own times. Plato wa s far right; Aristotle was
somewhat liberal. 5pinoza was a revolutionary;
Descartes was a royalist, and so on. These are well
known facts. There are some guys that you can't classify. It came out just as you are intimating: the humanists are predominantly left-wing and the mainstream
predominantly right wing. Any explanation would be
speculative, but intuitively it makes sense. For instance,
one main version of mainstream philosophy of mathematics is Platonism. It says that all mathematical ob jects, entities, or whatever, including the ones we
haven't discovered yet and the ones we never will discover-all of them have always existed. There's no
change in the realm of mathematics. We discover
things, our kn owledge increases, but the actual mathematical universe is completely static. Always wa s,
always will be. Well, that's kind of conservative, you
know. Fits in with someone who th ink s that social institutions mustn't change.
So this parallel exists. But there are exceptions. For
instance, Bertrand Russell wa s a Platonist and a socialist. One of my favorite philosophers, Imre Lakatos,
was a right-winger politically, but very radical philosophically. These correlations are loose and statistical,
not binding. You can 't tell somebod y's philosophy from
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his po litics, or vice versa.

of nine objects is a physical thing, which certainly exists without u s. The two kinds of nine are different.

I sea rched for a su itable label for my ideas. There were
several others tha t ha d been used for simil ar points of Like I can say a plate is round, an objective fact, but
view-social constructivism, fallibilism, qu asi-em piri- the conception of roundn ess, mathe matical roundness,
cism , na tura lism . I d idn't want to take anybod y else's is something else.
label, bec ause I was blazing my ow n trail, and I d idn't
want to label myself with some one else's school. The Sad to say, philosophy is definitely an op tiona l activname that would have been most accurate was social ity; most people, including mathematicians, d on't even
conc ep tualism. Mathematics consists of concep ts, bu t know if they have a philosophy, or what their philosono t ind ivid ually held concep ts; socially held concep ts. phy is. Certainly what they d o w ould not be affected
Maybe I thought of humani sm because I bel on g to a by a philosophical controversy. This is tru e in many
group called the Humanistic Mathematics Network. other field s. To be ,a practitioner is one thing; to be a
Humanism is app rop ri ate, because it's saying that philosopher is another. To justify philosophical activmath is something human. There's no math without ity one must go to a deeper level , for instance as in
people. Many people think that ellipses and numbers Socrates' remark abou t the un examined life. It's paand so on are there whether or not any people know thetic to be a mathematician all your life and never
worry, or think, or care, w hat that means. Many peopl e
about the m; I think that's a confusion .
do it. I compare this to a salmon swimming upstream.
JB: Sounds like we're talk ing abou t an anthropic prin- He knows how to swim upstream, but he doesn't know
what he 's d oin g or why.
ciple of mathematics here.
HERSH: Maybe so; I never thoug ht of tha t. I had a
serious argument with a friend of mine at the University of New Mexico, a philosopher of science. She said:
"There are nine planets; there were nine planets before there were any people. That means there was the
number nine, before we had any people."
There is a d ifficulty that has to be clarified. We do see
mathematical things, like small numbers, in physical
reality. And that seems to contradict the idea that numbers are social en tities. The way to straighten this out
ha s been pointed out by others also. We use nu mber
words in tw o different ways: as nouns and adjectives.
This is an important observ ation. We say nine apples,
nine is an adjective. If it's an objective fact that the re
are nine apples on the table, that's just as objective as
the fact that the apples are red, or that they're ripe, or
anything else about them, that's a fact. And there's really no special difficulty about that. Things become
difficult when we switch unconsciously, and carelessly,
between this real-world adj ective interpretati on of
math words like nine, and the pure abstraction that
we talk about in math class.
That's not reall y the same nine, although there's of
course a corr elation and a connection. But the number
nine as an abstract object, as part of a number system,
is a human possession, a human creation, it doesn't
exist without us. The po ssible existence of collections
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JB: How does having a philosophy of mathematics affect its teaching?
HERSH: The philosophy of mathematics is ver y pertinent to the teaching of mathematics. What's wrong
with mathematics teaching is not particular to thi s
country. People are very critical about math teaching
in the United States nowadays, as if it was just an
American problem. But even though some other countries get higher test score s, the fundamental mis-teaching and bad teaching of mathematics is international,
it's stand ard. In some ways w e're not as bad as some
other countries. But I don't want to get into that right
now.
Let me state three possible philosophical attitudes towards mathematics:
Platonism says mathematic s is abou t some ab stra ct
entities which are independent of humanity.
Formalism says mathematics is nothing b u t calculation s. There's no meaning to it at all. You just come
out with the right answer by followin g the rules.
Humanism sees mathematics as part of human cultu re

and human history.
It's hard to come to rigorous conclusions about this
3

kind o f thing , but I feel it 's almost obviou s that
Platonism and formali sm are anti-educational, and
interfere with understanding, and humanism at least
doesn't hurt and cou ld be beneficial.
Formalism is con n ected with rote, the traditional
method which is still common in m any parts of the
world. Here's an alg orithm; practice it for a while; now
here's another one. That's certainly what makes a lot
of people hate mathematics. (I don't mean that mathematicians who are formalists advocate teaching by
rote. But the formalist conception of mathematics fits
naturally with the rote method of instruction.)
There are various kinds of Platonists. Some are good
tea chers, some are bad. But the Platonist idea, that, as
my friend Phil Da vis puts it, pi is in the sky, helps to
make mathematics intimidating and remote, It can be
an excuse for a pupil's failure to learn, or for a teacher's
saying "som e people just don't get it."
The humanistic philosophy brings mathematics down
to earth, makes it accessible psychologically, and in creases the likelihood that som eone can learn it, becaus e it's just one of the things that people do. This is
a matter of opinion; there's no data, no tests. But I'm
convinced it is the case.
JB: How do you teach humanistic math?
HERSH: I'm going to sid estep that sligh tly, I'll tell you
my conception of goo d math teaching. How this connects with the philosophy may be more ten uous .
The essential thing is interaction, communication . Only
in math d o you have this typical figure who was supposedly exemplified b y Norbert Wiener. He walks into
the classroom, doesn't look at the class, starts writing
on th e board, keeps writing until the hour is over and
then departs, still without looking at the class.
A good math te acher star ts with examples. He first
asks the question and then gives the an swer, instead
of giving the answer without mentioning what the
question was. He is alert to the body language and
eye movements of th e class. If they start rolling their
eyes or leaning back, he will stop his proof or his calcu lation and force them so m eh ow to respond, even to
sa y "I don't get it." No math class is totally bad if the
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students are speaking up. And no math lecture is really good, no matter h ow beautiful, if it let s the audien ce become simply passive . Some of th is applies to
any kind of teaching, but math unfortunate ly is conducive to bad teaching.
It's so strange. Ma thematical theorems may really be
very useful. But nobody kn ows it. The tea cher doen't
mention it, the stu d ents d on 't kn ow it. All the y know
is it's part of the course. That's inhuman, isn't it?
Here is an anecdote. I teach a class, which I invented
myself" called Problem Solving for High School and
Junior High School Teachers and Future Teachers. The
idea is to get them into problem sol ving, having fun at
it, feeling confident at it, in the hope that when they
become teachers they will impart some of tha t to their
class. The s tud en ts had assi gnments; they were su p posed to work on something and then com e talk about
it in class. One day I called for volunteers. No volunteers. I waited. Waited. Then, feeling very brave , I went
to the back of the room and sat down and said nothing. For a while. And another while. Then a student
went to the blackboard, and then another on e.
It turned ou t to be a very go od class. The ke y was that
I was willing to shut up. The easy thing, which I had
done hundreds of times, would ha ve been to say,
"Okay, I'll show it to you." That's perhaps the biggest
difficulty for most, n early all , teachers-not to talk so
much. Be quiet. Don't think the world's coming to an
end if there's silence for two or three minutes.
JB: Earlier you mentioned the word beauty. What' s
w ith beauty?
HERSH: Fortunately, I have an answer to that. My
friend , Clan-Carlo Rota, dealt with that issue in his
new bo ok , Indiscrete Thoughts. He said the desire to
sa y "How beautiful!" is associated with an insigh t.
When so m eth in g unclear or confusing suddenly fits
together, that's beautiful. Ma ybe th ere are other situations that you would say are beautiful be sides that,
but I felt when I read that that he really had something. Because we talk about beauty all the time without being clear what we mean by it; it 's purely subjective, But Rota came very close to it. Order out of confusion, simplicity out of comp lexity, understanding out
of misunderstanding-that's mathematical beauty.
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